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The paper studies the optimal income taxation by adding utility interdependence over
labour choice. Both theoretically and numerically, it is shown that the optimal marginal
tax schedule could be progressive with this additional feature. Previous studies on op-
timal redistributive income taxation consider the consumption externalities but ignore the
labour interdependency. Specifically, if disutility depends on the average working hour,
the increase in an agent’s working hour creates positive externality on other agents as it
lowers the disutility of others. It is shown that as the degree of utility interdependence
increases, the tax schedule becomes more progressive. Moreover, the paper analyses the
effect of having a more dispersed skill distribution on the marginal income tax rates. By
using their wage distribution data as a proxy for their ability distribution, the optimal
marginal tax rates in the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic are examined. Consid-
ering the more unequal wage distribution in the UK, there should be a more progressive
tax schedule.
Keywords: Optimal Income Tax; Externalities
JEL Codes: H21; H23
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971), there has been a series of studies on the modern
optimal income taxation. Mirrlees indicates that a high marginal tax rate implemented to
the high productive workers distorts the labour supply decision and leads to a disincentive for
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working. Considering the efficiency loss, optimal income taxation might follow a regressive
pattern which means lower marginal tax rates for high-income earners. Even more strikingly,
Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977) show that the optimal income tax rate at the top of the income
(skill) distribution should be zero if there exists a finite maximum to the skill distribution.
There is an ongoing conflict between the optimal income taxation theory and the current
tax policies as there is almost no country with a regressive income tax schedule. Even Mirrlees
himself admitted he found the results of the study surprising1. Furthermore, Atkinson (1973),
Tuomala (1983,1990) verified Mirrlees (1971) regressive marginal tax result. However, Diamond
(1998) has shown that optimal tax schedule could be progressive at the upper tail of the income
distribution if the skill distribution is unbounded. Saez(2001) mentioned the progressivity of
the tax schedule when the link between optimal tax formulas and elasticities of earnings are
considered. It is important to note that these results are very sensitive to the skill distribution
assumptions. While Mirrlees and Tuomala use log-normal skill distribution, Diamond and Saez
assume Pareto distribution for the upper tail of the skill (income) distribution.
Theoretically, the optimal income tax has a very complex structure, and it is hard to
get clear-cut analytical results without making strong assumptions. According to Dahan and
Strawczynski (2000), when the utility of consumption is concave, the optimal marginal tax for
the high-income earners is unclear. Because a concave utility implies weaker income effects for
rich individuals, which is lowering the tax rates. However, a concave utility of consumption
also affects the inequality aversion and leads to a rise in tax rates. Due to these opposite forces,
Dahan and Strawczynski(2000) mentions that under the concave utility of consumption, one
can only use simulations to determine the shape of the marginal tax rates.
Mirrlees (1971) paper also relies on simulations to obtain tax schedules. In these simulations,
Mirrlees finds a slightly decreasing pattern for marginal taxes over the skill distribution. This
almost linear decreasing pattern for marginal taxes is criticised by Atkinson (1973) and Tuomala
(1984). They claim that this linear and almost constant tax rates are due to the specific
functional forms used by Mirrlees (1971). By using a maximin objective function Atkinson
(1973) shows that there will be a non-linear pattern for the marginal tax schedule. Tuomala
(1984,1990,1994) find an inverted U-shaped profile for marginal taxes which exhibits a non-
linear pattern but again declining marginal tax rates for high-income earners. Dahan and
Strawczynski (2000) shows that rising marginal tax rates in Diamond (1998) depend on the
assumption of utility for consumption. In their simulations, they find that with a linear utility
for consumption; it is possible to have an increasing marginal tax pattern for high-income
earners even with a log-normal ability distribution. Their paper shows the importance of
utility for consumption in determining the tax schedule.
In this study, we consider optimal marginal income taxation by adding utility interde-
1“I must confess that I had expected the rigorous analysis of income-taxation in the utilitarian manner to
provide an argument for high taxes. It has not done so.”, Sir James A. Mirrlees, “An Exploration in the Theory
of Optimum Income Taxation”.
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pendence over labour choice. Both theoretically and numerically, we show that the optimal
marginal tax schedule could be progressive with this additional feature. Previous studies on
optimal redistributive income taxation consider the consumption externalities but ignore the la-
bour interdependency of agents. Samano (2009) investigates the consumption externalities and
mentions the progressivity effect of the consumption externality over tax schedules. Oswald
(1983), Tuomala (1990), Kanbur and Tuomala (2010) look at the tax schedule when agents
value their consumptions relative to the average consumption. Tuomala (1990), Kanbur and
Tuomala (2010) find support for greater progressivity in the tax structure as relative consump-
tion concern increases. According to Oswald (1983) if there is utility interdependence then zero
marginal tax at the top of the skill (income) distribution result does not hold. He claims that
if utility is separable and the agent’s behaviour (consumption-labour choice) is not affected by
the relative concern, then this additional relative consumption concern leads to a progressive
marginal income tax schedule. Also, he mentions that marginal taxes could be negative in this
environment.
To the best of our knowledge, the only study with labour externalities under a Mirrleesian
framework is Oztek (2011). This study analyses the tax schedule by adding utility interdepend-
ence over labour choice and shows that optimal marginal income taxation could be progressive
depending on the parameters of the model. There are two separate forces that are at work
in determining the optimal tax schedule. First, due to the informational problems, there is a
usual Mirrleesian force that works towards the regressivity of taxes. The second effect is a novel
force that arises from labour externality and has a progressive effect on the income tax. This
effect could be called as Pigouvian tax. Labour externality requires subsidies for agents which
are asymmetric according to productivities. Due to this asymmetry, there should be higher
subsidies for low types which has a progressive effect on the optimal tax schedule. Additionally,
when labour interdependence is added to the model, zero tax at the top of the skill distribution
result is no longer valid.
Oztek (2011) analyses the tax schedule under a quasi-linear utility in an N-type model.
With a quasi-linear utility form, it is possible to solve the tax functions analytically. However,
when we consider Dahan and Strawczynski (2000) results, this type of utility could also give a
progressive tax schedule without labour interdependence. Therefore, using a quasi-linear utility
function may represent a limited idea about the effect of labour externality. Moreover in Oztek
(2011), labour externality does not affect agent’s behaviour, so it is not possible to see the effect
of labour externality when agent’s behaviour is changed. Also, Oztek (2011) does not have any
comparable simulations with the existing tax literature which holds a crucial role in optimal
taxation studies.
In this study, first, we set up an N-type model with a separable utility form and show
the progressive effect of labour externality. To interpret the results clearly, we used a specific
(log utility) form of utility function which is used by Tuomala (1990) for consumption interde-
pendence. Tuomala(1990) and Oswald(1983) analyse the cases where the agent’s behaviour is
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not affected by the additional relative consumption concern. However, we show that even the
agent’s behaviour is changed, it is possible to have a progressive tax schedule. The change in the
agent’s behaviour solely shows up in the Mirrleesian part of the tax function as an additional
regressive force.
Simulations constitute an important part of this study as explicit solution is not pos-
sible with a log-utility. By assuming a log-normal skill distribution with parameters (µ, σ) =
(−1, 0.39)2, we show that as the degree of utility interdependence increases, the tax schedule
becomes more progressive. Also, we analysed the effect of having a more dispersed skill distribu-
tion on the marginal income tax rates. We conduct various tests in the numerical examples part,
but the most important examples are summarized in Table 1. Mirrlees(1971) regressive result
is based on a logarithmic utility and log-normal skill distribution. Diamond(1998) changes the
utility of consumption to a linear form and uses a Pareto distribution for skills. By doing these
changes he reverses the regressive pattern of Mirrlees to an increasing pattern for the high-
income earners. However, Dahan and Strawczynski(2000) suggests that under linear utility for
consumption there is no need to assume a Pareto distribution for a progressive tax schedule.
A rising pattern for high-income earners is also possible with a log-normal distribution. The
last two rows of Table 1 show our numerical examples by adding utility interdependence to the
model. With this additional concern it could be said that even under a logarithmic utility for
consumption, it is possible to have a rising pattern for high-income earners.







Optimal Tax at High
Levels of Income
Mirrlees(1971) Logarithmic Logarithmic Log-normal Declining
Diamond(1998) Logarithmic Linear Pareto Rising
D&S(2000) Example 1 Logarithmic Logarithmic Pareto Declining
D&S(2000) Example 2 Logarithmic Linear Log-normal Rising
Our Example 1 Logarithmic Logarithmic Log-normal Weakly Rising
Our Example 2 Logarithmic Linear Log-normal Rising
Finally, in the last part of the numerical examples, by using their wage distribution as a
proxy for their ability distribution, we have analysed the marginal tax rates in the United
Kingdom and the Czech Republic. According to OECD data and the log-normal estimations
of wage distributions, United Kingdom has a more unequal wage distribution than the Czech
Republic. By using Cowell(2011) and Mala and Nedved(2011) parameter estimates for log-
normal wage distribution, we show that the United Kingdom should have a more progressive
tax schedule than the Czech Republic.
This study considers utility interdependence among agents over their labour supply de-
cisions. Unlike most studies which claim people derive disutility from their own work only,
2Parameters of Mirrlees(1971).
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this paper suggests that individuals also care about other people working hours. Therefore,
in our setup, we use the combination of their own and other people’s labour choice v(l, L) as
the form of utility(disutility) for leisure(labour), where L denotes the average working hour
in the society. Specifically, if disutility depends on the average work hour, the increase in an
agent’s working hour has a positive externality on other agents because it lowers the disutility
of others.
Labour interdependence among people has been an interesting topic for economists over the
decades. Economists like Veblen and Pigou have mentioned this fact in their works: people are
affecting each other’s labour decisions. Not only the income and consumption but people also
consider and compare their leisure (labour) hours with the others. Veblen (1899) found a great
term for this fact as “conspicuous consumption and conspicuous leisure”.3 Arthur Pigou(1920)
on the other hand, found a more straightforward way to explain it: “men do not desire to be
rich, but richer than other men”.
Several micro-level studies in labour economics pay attention to direct interactions between
the agents. Grodner and Kniesner (2006,2009) show that labour interdependency has a signi-
ficant effect on the agent’s labour supply decision. Aromsson, Blomquist, and Sacklen (1999)
analyses people’s choices for working hours. They mention that people are influenced by each
other’s hours of work and neglecting this could lead to serious underestimates of the labour
supply effects of income taxes. As an empirical example, Weinberg et al. (2004) finds that an
extra hour worked by the social reference group of an individual can increase the individuals
total working hours by 0.6 in the United States. Moreover, Pingle and Mitchell (2002) finds
evidence of leisure positionality in a questionnaire-based study. They mention that most income
is derived from allocating time toward labour and leisure; therefore, any observed positional
concern for income is potentially confounded with a positional concern for leisure.4
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the model, section 3 presents
the separable utility case, section 4 assumes a specific form of utility, section 5 presents the
case when behaviour is changed due to utility interdependence, section 6 shows the numerical
examples, section 7 conducts the simulations for United Kingdom and Czech Republic, finally
section 8 concludes.
3“...the utility of both (conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption) alike for the purposes of reputab-
ility lies in the waste that is common to both. In the one case it is a waste of time and effort, in the other it is
a waste of goods. Both are methods of demonstrating the possession of wealth, and the two are conventionally
accepted as equivalents.” The Theory of the Leisure Class, 1899.
4For other studies about labour interdependency see: Baskaya, Y., and Kilinc, M. (2010), Woittiez and
Kapteyn (1998), Becker and Murphy (2000) Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003), Elster (1989), Fryer




For the theoretical discussion, first, we start with a general separable utility form. Afterwards,
we utilize a specific form of utility function which is used in Mirrlees (1971) and Tuomala(1990).
However, in this type of utility, the agent’s behaviour is not affected by additional labour
externality concern. In the incentive compatibility constraint, labour externality shows up in
both sides of the equation in the same form, and these cancels out each other. Therefore, in
the next stage, we use a specific form of utility in which the agent’s behaviour is affected by the
labour interdependence. Even in this case, we show the progressive effect of labour externality.
The paper utilises an N-type model, and agents are heterogeneous about their privately
known productivity levels. An agent with a productivity level θ has a separable utility function
in the form of consumption and labour;












is the average working hour of the
society. Production function is y = θl, thus labour equals to l = y
θ
in terms of working hours.
There could be many alternative interpretations of the variable L. In this paper, we use the
Tuomala(1990) approach. While Tuomala(1990) uses the average consumption of people in the
economy for testing the effect of utility interdependence, we use the average working hour of
the society to examine the effects of labour interdependence on the optimal tax rates.
Assumptions of the model are as follows:
i) Preferences satisfy the usual assumptions that; u′(c) > 0,u′′(c) < 0 and v1(
y
θ




, L) > 0.








, L) > 0 which means the agent who works more is getting a higher disutility
decrease from a rise in L.
While agents derive utility from consumption, as usual, working is a source of disutility. In
this setup, they also derive utility from an increase in average working hour, because agent’s
disutility is decreasing with the average working hour of the society.
3 Separable Utility Case
The aim of the social planner is to maximize the overall welfare of the society while evaluating
all agents equally. πi is the proportion of the different productive agents in the society and it is
normalised to 1. In the presence of information asymmetry, which arises when the productivity
is private information of agent and cannot be observed by the social planner, the social planner














































, θi+1 > θi for all i and µ1 = 0
Letting λ and µi be the multipliers on the feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints
respectively, FOCs are as follows:
(ci): πiu′(ci)− λπi + µiu′(ci)− µi+1u′(ci) = 0








































































































































is the marginal cost of














term is the summation of all marginal benefits when type-i
agent increase his working hour. Therefore, each agent creates an externality asymmetric to his
productivity. A low ability agent is creating much more externality than a high ability agent
in order to increase his consumption by one unit. Other terms in the FOCs are the usual terms
arises from asymmetric information.
In order to implement optimal taxes, the social planner should consider the market optim-
ality conditions of agents. In the market, agents know that they derive utility from the average
working hour, but they are not aware of the fact that they can affect the average working hour.












c ≤ y − τ(y)
Letting λ be the multiplier on the budget (resource) constraint, FOCs are as follows:






+ λ(1− τ ′(y)) = 0
which gives;










where if there were no taxes, agents would equalize their marginal costs and benefits.
Marginal tax is an important public policy instrument that mainly cares about the dis-
tributional concerns. The following proposition presents the optimal non-linear marginal tax
function of each agent.
Proposition 1. Optimal Marginal Income Tax;










































































































From (cN): u′(cN) [πN + µN ] = λπN
Dividing both side gives;


































































































From (ci): u′(ci) [πi + µi − µi+1] = λπi




























































































































term is the labour externality component. By assumption v11(
y
θ
, L) > 0 so that φi < 1. With
this condition we can come up with Ψi < 1. Without labour externality there will be a positive
tax for all types. However, when we add the labour externality, tax schedule is not clear.
If (1 + 1
λθi










term in Υ is always negative and with the minus sign, it will always be a positive







which says the agent who works more is getting a higher disutility decrease from an increase in
L. This assumption implies v2(
yi−1
θi
, L) > v2(
yi
θi
, L), and because both terms are negative, their
difference will be a positive term. Then one can conclude that Υ term will be always positive
under this assumption. Then labour externality term will be a progressive force on the marginal
tax schedule. Also, if agents who work different numbers of hours get the same benefit from
an increase in L then v2(
yi−1
θi
, L) and v2(
yi
θi
, L) terms will be equal and the first bracket in Υ
will be zero. Then, Υ will be a positive term which leads to a progressive tax schedule. If the
optional assumption is violated it is not possible to claim that labour externality has always a
progressive effect on marginal taxes. For all cases, the multiplication of two forces will identify
the tax schedules. In the cases where labour externality progressive effect exceeds regressive
Mirrleesian component, there will be a progressive tax schedule.
When we consider the effect of labour externality between any two agents, we should com-
pare their tax functions: (1− τ ′(yi)) = (1 +
1
λθi




Comparison of Ψi and Ψi+1 is the main concern of the literature in which there is no utility
interdependence. In absence of utility interdependence this comparison identifies the marginal
tax schedule which depends on the form of utility function and ability distribution. Leaving
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this discussion behind, we focus on the effect of labour externality on the tax rates. We know





Υ and shows the
progressive effect of labour interdependence on the agents’ tax rates.
By using a general separable utility function, it is hard to interpret the results in a clear
way. Therefore, in the following section, we assume a particular form of utility and examine
the marginal tax schedule.
4 Log-Utility Case
In this section, we assume a particular log-utility function used in Mirrlees(1971) and Tuomala(1990)
papers. We change the consumption interdependence form of Tuomala(1990) to a labour inter-






















































, θi+1 > θi for all i and µ1 = 0
Where β reflects the degree of concern, namely shows how much an agent cares about other
people working hours. The problem turns out to be a standard Mirrleesian tax problem when
β = 0 and the degree of utility interdependence will increase as β increases. Letting λ and µi









































































In order to implement optimal rates, the social planner should use market condition. For
this utility form market condition becomes;
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⇒ (1− τ ′(y)) = c
θ−y
(See Appendix Part A for derivation)
Then tax functions will get the forms in proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Optimal Marginal Income Tax;
















(See Appendix Part B for derivations)





than zero. Therefore, the marginal tax rate for the top ability worker is strictly negative under
labour interdependence. In the tax function for type-i, while the first term in parentheses is
the externality component, Ψi term is the usual Mirrlees term.
Proposition 3. Tax schedule becomes more progressive as the degree of concern β increases.




will increase. Also, as β goes up, marginal
subsidies for all agents will increase. However, because these subsidies are allocated asymmetric
to their abilities, low able agents will get more subsidies than the high able ones. This asym-
metry creates a progressive effect on the tax schedule. Note that in these comments we put
aside the changes in Mirrlees effect Ψi. The magnitude of Ψi will be affected by the difference
between θi and θi+1. Assume that θi+1 is excessively greater than θi, then the denominator of Ψi
will be greater, therefore Ψi term will get closer to zero. Obviously, this will have a regressive
effect on tax schedule. For this reason, the ability distribution assumption is very crucial in
determining the tax schedule. A very dispersed ability distribution in the upper tail of the
distribution will create a regressive force on the tax schedule. However, this high difference
will create a higher progressive force over the labour externality component. It the end, the
structure of the tax rates will be identified by these opposing forces.
In this utility form, interdependence does not affect individuals’ labour supply decisions.
Because of the form of adding labour externality to the question, the incentive compatibility
constraint does not change. The following section changes the way of adding labour externality
to the problem and it shows that labour externality has a progressive effect on the tax schedule
even if the agent’s behaviour is changed.
5 Log-Utility Form with Changing Behaviour
In this section, we assume a particular form of utility in which the labour externality affects
agents’ labour supply decisions. The only difference between section 4 is the way of adding
11






























































, θi+1 > θi for all i and µ1 = 0
In this utility form agents are getting utility when they are working less than the society,
however, if they are working more than other people L
yi/θi
term will be less than one which gives
a negative value for logarithm, so reduces the utility.
Letting λ and µi be the multipliers on the feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints





































































































For this type of utility market condition becomes;







⇒ (1− τ ′(y)) = [y+β(θ−y)]c
y(θ−y)
(See Appendix Part C for derivation)
By using this condition, marginal taxes under additional incentive problem with labour
externalities are in proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Optimal Marginal Income Taxes;





















(See Appendix Part D for derivations)
Tax function for the top agent is exactly the same with the previous case. Due to the no
distortion at the top, additional incentive problem does not create any change in the tax for the
top agent. Note that, this is true for tax function forms not for the rates, because the problems
are different, Lagrange multipliers could be different, so the marginal tax rates. The following
proposition shows that the conditions are not the same for other agents.
Proposition 5. Marginal tax function for type-i person for both utility functions are as follows:




















Again, tax functions are not directly comparable as the problems are different. However,
the labour externality component is not affected by additional concern for behavioural change.
This additional concern shows up in the Mirrleesian component and it increases the regressive
effect of the Mirrleesian component since θi+1 > θi. Note that this result might be specific for
assumed utility forms. The labour externality can be added to the model in many ways. If the
utility function is not separable, it could be possible to have a case where both components are
affected.
Equations for marginal taxes contain endogenous variables. Therefore, it is not possible to
give a precise condition that makes the income schedule progressive. As Dahan and Straw-
czynski(2000) mentioned, under the concave utility of consumption, literature is bound to use
simulations to determine the shape of marginal tax rates. The following section presents various
numerical examples under log-normal skill distribution.
6 Numerical Examples
In this part of the paper, we conduct numerical examples and analyse tax schedules under
the presence of labour interdependence. For the sake of comparison with the literature, the
logarithmic utility of leisure is assumed for all cases. In order to compare with Mirrlees, first,
we assume logarithmic utility of consumption, and then to compare with Diamond(1998) we
utilize linear utility of consumption to analyse the effect of labour externality.
Since the model and the skill distributions are discrete, zero tax at the top result holds for
the Mirrlees case. As the tax rate turns out to be zero, there is a big break in graphs, therefore,
we exclude the last person from some of the figures. However in our examples with labour
externality, there is a subsidy for the last agent.
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For simulations, we use the utility form presented in section 4, which is a reformed version
of Tuomala(1990,2010). All simulations are performed for the strict utilitarian case.
Kanbur and Tuomala(2010) focuses specifically on the progressive impact of consumption
relativity on tax schedules and concludes that as the degree of relative concern increases mar-
ginal tax rate increases at all levels of income. They consider consumption externalities and
because high-income earners consume more, they create higher negative externality than the
others. While the negative externality is the reason for the progressive tax schedule in their
paper, in our analysis the reason for progressivity is the positive externality. Low able agents
work more, create more positive externality and thus, get more subsidies than high-able agents.
Figure 1 shows the tax rates under Mirrlees and labour externality. Both calculations
are based on logarithmic utility and log-normal skill distribution with parameters (µ, σ) =
(−1, 0.39). While the left axis shows the tax rates for Mirrlees, the right axis shows the tax
rates under labour externality for β = 1. Mirrlees case has an inverse-U shaped tax schedule and
the tax rate of the top agent is zero. By using the same parameters, adding labour externality
to the problem changes the tax pattern. As it is shown in the analytical solution, tax is negative
and there is a subsidy for all agents. However, these subsidies are asymmetric to the agent’s
abilities. Therefore, while the ability increases the subsidy decreases, which forms a progressive
tax schedule.
By assuming a log-utility and log-normal skill distribution, Mirrlees example has a slightly
decreasing tax pattern, however, Diamond(1998) changes the utility of consumption from log-
arithmic to a linear form and assumed a Pareto skill distribution. As a result, he claimed that
the optimal tax schedule has a U-shaped pattern. The study of Dahan and Strawczynski(2000)
stated that this result depends on the assumed utility form. In other words, when the utility
form is logarithmic even if the skill distribution is Pareto there is a regressive tax schedule
for high-ability agents. According to their study, the factor that determines the shape of tax
schedule at high incomes is the assumed utility form.
Most often literature focuses on high-income earner’s tax ratios; actually, theoretically the
interesting result is the diminishing tax ratios in this part of the distribution. Figure 2 gives a
summary of Table 1. In Mirrlees case, if utility of consumption is linear under log-normal skill
distribution, regressive tax schedule turns to progressive. However, if the labour externality
is considered, the tax schedule also becomes more progressive under the logarithmic utility of
consumption. When we assume linear consumption under the presence of labour externality,
the tax schedule becomes significantly progressive.
In this analysis, the linear consumption case is normalized with Mirrlees(1971) tax rates5.
From these simulations, one can say that the structure of the optimal marginal income tax rates
at high levels of income is sensitive to the assumed form of the utility for consumption. The
5Dahan and Strawczynski(2000) normalized their simulation results with Mirrlees F (0.9) = 19% tax. Our
simulation results are very close to those Mirrlees(1971) found. Therefore we do not need to do any normalization
for most of the cases. However, only for Figure 2, in order to compare exactly with Mirrlees(1971) and Dahan
& Strawczynski(2000), we normalize the taxes with Mirrlees F (0.9) = 19%.
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assumed utility form changes the Mirrlees and Diamond’s results completely. However in our
case, when we consider the utility interdependence over labour decisions, there is a progressive
tax schedule for both utility forms of consumption. Whether it is logarithmic or linear, the
optimal tax for the high-income earners is rising. However, it could be seen that under both
Mirrlees and labour externality cases, the tax schedule is progressive when we assume linear
utility for consumption. According to Dahan and Strawczynski(2000), these changes are due to
income effects. The logarithmic utility of consumption implies the presence of income effects
and a concave utility of consumption implies that income effects are weaker for rich individuals,
which calls for lower taxes at high levels of incomes. However in the linear consumption case,
there is no income effect. Therefore under linear utility for consumption, rising tax in high-
income levels is straightforward. However, present study shows that it is possible to get a rising
tax schedule at the upper tail even the utility for consumption is logarithmic.
The tax schedules according to the increasing standard deviation σ are displayed in Figure
3. In Mirrlees case when the skill distribution becomes more dispersed, regressivity increases,
as shown in the model section by comparing the Mirrleesian component in the tax functions.
Analytically, change in tax structure is not clear when we add labour interdependence. For
all levels of σ tax schedule turns to a progressive fashion, however it is not clear that which
one is more progressive. While more dispersed skill distribution creates a regressive force, it
also creates a progressive force over the labour externality component in the tax functions. As
mentioned, subsidies are asymmetric according to the productivities. If agents’ skills become
more dispersed, then their subsidies become distant to each other. This will increase the
progressivity effect of labour externality. On the other hand, a more dispersed skill distribution
leads to a regressive effect on tax schedules via Mirrleesian component in the tax function. For
all levels of σ, the structure of the tax schedule will be identified by these two opposing forces.
Therefore, under which case we have a more progressive tax schedule is not clear and could
change for different cases. For our particular example, the second panel in Figure 3 presents
the marginal tax rates under labour externality. Since it is hard to perceive which one is more
progressive, we normalized the tax rates with σ = 0.39 in the third panel. It is clear that a
higher standard deviation implies a more progressive tax schedule for our example. Apparently,
additional concern about labour externality reverses the regressive structure of marginal taxes
to a progressive one.
We expect that while the degree of labour interdependence increases, the progressive effect
is getting more powerful and convert the tax schedule from a regressive form to a progressive
one. Figure 4 is showing the effects of different β (externality concern) parameters on the
tax schedule which highlights the main idea of the present study. The point where β is zero
is the pure Mirrlees result. If we go down on the graph, parameter β increases. When β
increases, tax ratio decreases, and there is a transformation from a regressive schedule to a
progressive schedule. This result is consistent with the theoretical part and with the results of
Tuomala(1990) and Kanbur and Tuomala(2010), because as the agents’ concerns about society’s
15
working hour increases, the tax schedule becomes more progressive.
7 Optimal Marginal Taxes for United Kingdom and Czech
Republic
In order to compare the hypothetical log-normal skill distribution example with real life, we
examine the case of the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. For the United Kingdom, we
use Cowell(2011) log-normal wage distribution estimation as a proxy for skill distribution. This
estimation is based on the New Earnings Survey(2002) and considers the distribution of weekly
earnings of UK male manual workers for the year 2002. Parameters of the fitted log-normal
distribution are (µ, σ)= (5.84, 0.36). And for the Czech Republic, we used the estimation of
Mala and Nedved(2011) for hourly wage distribution. They used the data from the Average
Earnings Information System from 2000 to 2010 and estimate the parameters of the log-normal
distribution as (µ, σ) = (5.33, 0.24) for the non-business sector. These two data sets differ in
time periods; however, they give an idea about wage distributions.
Figure 5 shows the earnings profile of these two counties. Apparently, the UK has more
dispersed wage distribution than the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic’s wage distribution
exhibits a more linear and slightly increasing pattern. This is also verified by the calculations
of OECD for these countries.
According to the OECD earnings deciles data6, the UK has higher rates in all ratios for
90th-to-10th, 90th-to-50th and 50th-to-10th. From these data sets, one can conclude that UK
earnings distribution is more unequal than the Czech Republic. By using these log-normal
distributions, the marginal tax rates under Mirrlees and labour externality are presented in
Figure 6.
At the first panel of Figure 6, when there is no labour interdependence, a more dispersed
ability distribution means a more regressive tax schedule. Therefore, the UK has a more re-
gressive tax schedule. When we add the labour externality to the problem, both tax schedules
turn to a progressive fashion. However, additional externality concern reverses the tax pat-
terns. Second and third panel (normalized) of Figure 6 show that the UK should have a more
progressive tax structure due to the higher progressive force over the externality component in
the tax function. This is an example where the progressivity effect of labour externality exceeds
the regressive force of the Mirrleesian component in the tax function.
This pattern for tax rates implies a more progressive income tax schedule in societies with
a more unequal skill distribution. According to the Tax Database of OECD, the European
countries like Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium have more progressive marginal tax
6OECD Earnings Deciles Study - www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/59/39606921.xls
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schedules than the US7. And it is also known that according to the studies that are mostly using
the International Adult Literacy Survey shows that the skills are more unequally distributed
in the US than in the EU. In the absence of labour externality, optimal tax theory and tax
policies seem inconsistent within each country(since theory implies regressive marginal rates).
However, the existing theory explains the differences in tax structures across countries. When
the labour interdependence is considered, the actual tax policy of countries is understandable
and the theory could rationalise the expectation of higher tax progressivity for more unequal
societies.
8 Conclusion
Discussion on tax rates is not only a subject for economists, but also a subject for ordinary
people. However, while most people believe that the government should implement higher
marginal tax rates for the high-income earners, optimal tax literature has difficulty explaining
the progressive fashion of the actual tax systems. In this study, we have used the separable
utility form in an N-type model and show the progressive effect of labour externality. We show
that even if the agent’s behaviour is affected by this additional feature, it is possible to have a
progressive tax schedule.
In the tax literature, most of the papers rely on simulations to obtain tax schedules. By
assuming the same utility form and skill distribution as Mirrlees(1971) it is possible to have a
progressive tax under the presence of labour externality. Therefore, to have a progressive tax
schedule, it is not necessary to assume a Pareto skill distribution or quasi-linear utility form as
in Diamond(1998). We have shown that as the degree of utility interdependence increases, the
tax schedule becomes more progressive. Numerical examples show that a more dispersed skill
distribution does not mean a more regressive tax schedule, because as the skill distribution gets
dispersed, the progressive effect of labour externality increases.
By using their wage distribution data as a proxy for their ability distribution, we have ana-
lysed the marginal tax rates in the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. We show that the
United Kingdom should have a more progressive tax structure than the Czech Republic because
the UK ability distribution is more dispersed than the Czech Republic ability distribution.
We understood from this study that corrective concerns about the model make the model
closer to real life and the expectation of the society. We have shown theoretically and numer-
ically that actual tax schedules could be rationalised by changing the model features.
7OECD Tax Database, or the marginal tax calculation in Mankiw et al. (2009).
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Figures
Figure 1: Marginal Tax Rates under Mirrlees and Labour Externality






























Figure 2: Marginal Tax Rates under Log and Linear Utilities for Consumption
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Figure 3: Marginal Tax Rates under Different Standard Deviations
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Figure 4: Marginal Tax Rates for Different β




















Figure 5: Earnings in United Kingdom and Czech Republic
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Figure 6: Marginal Taxes for the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic
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Appendix
A - Derivation of Market Condition for Log-Utility





















c ≤ y − τ(y)
Letting λ be the multiplier on the resource (feasibility) constraint, FOCs are as follows:
(c) : 1
c







+ λ(1− τ ′(y)) = 0
which gives;
(1− τ ′(y)) =
c
θ − y
B - Derivation of Tax Rates for Log-Utility Case
Market Condition: (1− τ ′(y)) = c
θ−y

















[πi + µi − µi+1] = λπi



















C - Derivation of Market Condition for Log-Utility Form With Changing
Behaviour


















c ≤ y − τ(y)
Letting λ be the multiplier on the resource (feasibility) constraint, FOCs are as follows:
(c) : 1
c












+ λ(1− τ ′(y)) = 0
which gives;
(1− τ ′(y)) =
[y + β(θ − y)] c
y(θ − y)
D - Derivation of Tax Rates for Log-Utility Form With Changing Behaviour
Market Condition: (1− τ ′(y)) = [y+β(θ−y)]c
y(θ−y)



















[πi + µi − µi+1] = λπi











Similar manipulations for type-N gives; (1− τ ′(yN)) = 1 +
1
λθN
β
L
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